Drawing from relevant experiences in power systems around the world, this paper offers a critical review of existing policy support mechanisms for RES-E (renewable energy sources for electricity), with a detailed analysis of their regulatory implications. While recent studies provide an account of current RES-E support systems, in this paper we focus on the impacts these mechanisms have on the overall energy market structure and its performance in the short and long term. Given the rising importance of RES-E in systems everywhere, these impacts can no longer be overlooked.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, renewable energy sources for electricity (RES-E) have gained much importance in electric power systems around the world. These technologies are growing steadily to occupy a central role in electricity generation. Consider that in 2009, 60% of newly installed capacity in Europe came from RES-E. (REN21, 2010) . Note that the European Commission's Directive 2009/28/EC establishes "mandatory national targets consistent with a 20% share of energy from renewable sources and a 10 % share of energy from renewable sources in transport in Community energy consumption by 2020." At national level in 2010, just to mention some of the most paradigmatic examples, in Denmark wind accounted for 20% of the gross electricity production (Danish Energy Agency, 2011), in Germany (BMU, 2011) RES-E's contribution to electricity supply was close to 17% (wind amounted for roughly a third of it), Spain relies on wind to supply over 15% of electricity (CNE, 2011) and in Texas wind energy represented 7.8% (ERCOT, 2011) .
RES-E's crucial role, particularly in EU's electricity sector, is expected to be even more important in the near future: for 2020, the Danish Government (2011) announced that more than 60% of electricity production will have renewable origin, while the target of the German Government (BMU, 2011) is a 35% share of RES-E in total gross electricity consumption and the Spanish government expects RES-E to contribute 42% of total electricity demand (MITyC & IDAE, 2010 ).
Yet, the still comparatively higher cost of RES-E technologies has made it virtually impossible for them to grow without regulatory intervention. There is still considerable uncertainty among governments and regulatory agencies about the kind of policy framework needed to manage the incorporation of these technologies into the larger generation mix of a country or region. Support mechanisms for RES-E are colliding with existing economic and industrial policies much more frequently; this clash often reflects political sensitivity to voters' perceptions and stakeholders' interests. More tangible concerns include the potential for RES-E to displace older and more polluting technologies, the impact costlier RES-E can have on energy prices, and the effects that the stochastic nature of renewable fuels has on the delivery of electricity. Thus, while in this last decade the RES-E technology learning has been very important, the regulatory learning has not been so pronounced, and a large number of crucial regulatory questions are still waiting for a proper response. 1 Prominent among these unsolved issues is how best to design subsidy regimes to ensure the proper development of RES-E. Currently, there are two different types of support methods:
• Indirect methods, i.e. implicit payments or discounts as well as institutional support tools that include: research and development funding, below-cost provision of infrastructure or services (costs of technical adaptations such as shadow connection charging (Auer et al., 2009) or costs of imbalances and ancillary services in general), 2 and positive discriminatory rules (such as regulations facilitating grid access for RES-E power, RES-E dispatch priority in the EU and other: net metering, building codes, etc.).
• Direct methods-these methods refer to investment supports, such as capital grants, tax exemptions or reductions on the purchase of goods and operating support mechanisms, i.e. price subsidies, obligations, tenders and tax exemptions on production (Commission of the European Communities, 2008).
Drawing from relevant experiences in power systems around the world, this paper offers a critical overview of existing policy supports for RES-E, with a focus on direct methods. We provide a detailed review of the different schemes and design features implemented to date, keeping an analytical distinction between the two categories for direct methods: price-based supports, which fix the price to be paid for renewable electricity, and quantity-based supports, which determine a specific amount of electricity to be produced by RES-E. While recent studies provide an account of current RES-E support systems, in this paper we focus on the impacts that these mechanisms have on the overall energy market structure and its performance in the short-and long-term. Given the rising importance of RES-E in systems everywhere, these impacts can no longer be overlooked.
1 See Pérez-Arriaga (2011) for a discussion of how power systems can properly manage large scale penetration of intermittent renewables and also some of the regulatory implications.
2 For instance, in Italy, RES-E receive remunerations at the spot market price, but, in contrast to Spain's wind markets, Italian generating units are exempt from paying the cost of their imbalances in the short term.
Incidentally, this provides them with a negative incentive to underestimate the expected production to be declared in the day-ahead market, since this bias increases the spot market price thus ensuring a higher remuneration. RES-E generating units need not worry themselves with penalties or the correction of imbalances that must take place in the secondary markets. Similar issues have been observed in Spain in the case of reactive control services (Imaz, 2007) .
RES-E DIRECT REGULATORY SUPPORT SCHEMES

Price-Based Mechanisms
Feed-in-Tariffs
The basic feature of feed-in tariffs (FIT) is to guarantee RES-E generators a specific price per MWh that is produced. To encourage development of new RES-E capacity, FIT must be high enough to ensure long-term recovery of costs for a given technology. In most power systems, FIT at least apply during 10 years; in some cases, support is guaranteed for as many as 30 years. According to the most recent REN21 Global Status Report, by 2010 at least 50 countries and 25 states and provinces had instituted FIT supports for RES-E generators.
FIT have been in place for a good number of years now. As a result, FIT have progressively incorporated a variety of rules into the basic, original design, namely:
• Regulatory agreements or contracts: in some cases the FIT just takes the form of a regulatory commitment that is embedded in some law or specific decree (as is the case in Spain). In other cases, such as Germany, the FIT mechanism takes the form of a contract that has the System Operator as counter-party (Lipp, 2007) .
• Flat or stepped tariffs 3 : The cost of RES-E development can vary greatly depending on the choice of technology (wind vs. solar vs. biomass) and other characteristics such as siting or scale (e.g. onshore vs. offshore wind). For this reason, some governments offer so-called "stepped" tariffs-differentiated levels of remuneration according to the RES-E profile. 4 Tariff levels can be defined according to (mainly) technology, location or plant size. As stated in Brown et al. (2009) , the chief aim of stepped tariffs is to try to minimize the "risk of overcompensating plants with efficient technologies or scale (excessive rents) and to reduce the cost of support or burden for consumers." While it may appear sensible to distinguish among technologies such as wind or solar PV (a single tariff for all of them would lead to exploiting just the most cost-efficient technology in the short term) 5 , applying stepped tariffs within a single technology is not necessarily good. Aside from the fact that differentiation significantly complicates the tariff-setting process, stepped mechanisms also minimize the potential for tariffs to send an efficiency signal to market players, since these tariffs mitigate the incentive to invest in the most efficient alternatives first.
• Constant or decreasing payment stream: FIT can follow either a constant or a decreasing payment structure through the contract period. In Germany, FIT for solar PVs maintain the same level of remuneration with contracts that usually last 20 years. In contrast, an alternative model is to design a larger payment in the first years of operation and reduce it progressively afterwards. This solution helps to reduce the need for substantial project 3 See Klein et al. (2008) for a detailed analysis. 4 For instance, in Germany, FIT for rooftop solar PV vary depending on the size-up to 30 MW; between 30 kW and 100 kW; above 100 kW; and above 1,000 kW. 5 It is important to note that the objective of RES-E support mechanisms is not to encourage the deployment of a single technology (e.g. the cheapest) in the short-term, but rather to improve the learning curve of a variety of RES-E types. This is because it is never clear which of RES-E type will become the most efficient in the long run.
finance. Sometimes, the reduction is proportional to the plant's performance in this first period, again with the goal of mitigating "excessive" rents.
• Tariff degression: in this approach remuneration for RES-E generators is scheduled to decrease overtime either at a pre-determined rate or according to the capacity that gets installed. There is considerable difficulty in correctly identifying the starting point for degression and the degression rate, especially if RES-E projects experience delays and changes in their long-term expenditures. Some countries, like Germany, set annual degression rates; percentage decreases are also technology-specific. Spain's degression rates are determined by the National Energy Commission (CNE) and applied not annually but every three months. 6 Degression is implemented as a way to counter RES-E energy surplus and is a reasonable way of preventing disproportionate deployment of a particular RES-E technology. As far as the general public opinion goes, disproportionate deployment fuels many of the political arguments against renewables-that it is too expensive, that supports are too generous, that RES-E places too much of a tariff burden on final consumers, etc. 7 On the other hand, degression can nonetheless pose a significant regulatory risk for investors: if the degression rates change during the project development process, investors may not be able to meet their originally expected return requirements.
Some countries have begun to attach additional requirements to existing FIT regimes. For example, in Denmark, remuneration for renewable power is offered only if RES-E owners provide financial participation to property owners in the lands surrounding the plant site.
Feed-in Premiums
Feed-in-premiums (FIP) are payments guaranteed to RES-E generators on top of existing electricity market prices; thus, FIP operate much like a kind of 'renewable' capacity payment. Similar to FIT, these premiums are valid for a specific contract period. In Spain, as proposed in Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2005) and afterwards mandated by the Royal Decree 661/2007, premiums are offered only within a specific range, i.e. they have a floor and some sort of a cap. 8 In the case of Finland, the new subsidy scheme established in January 2011 consists of a FIP payable for 12 years, according to which wind installations receive the NordPool market price plus the difference between a target price (83.5 EUR/MWh, 105.3 €/MWh if the installation enters in operation before the end of 2015) and the average of the spot market price in the last 3 months (Holttinen, 2011) .
Fiscal Incentives and Other Price-Based Mechanisms
Tax Incentives
A variety of fiscal incentives usually complement RES-E support mechanisms. In the United States, this type of incentive is best exemplified by the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS). Under MACRS, the U.S. government offers an accelerated depreciation schedule over a 5-year period to most RES-E technologies: solar PV and solar thermal, fuel cells and micro turbines, geothermal electric, direct use geothermal and geothermal heat pumps, small wind, and combined heat and power. Some biomass facilities are eligible for 7-year depreciation schedules, see "Energy Property" clause in IRS (2011). Other tax-based incentives include tax exemptions offered to RES-E generators on the basis of installed capacity as well as total renewable energy production. For instance, in Finland, the tax on fuels is determined on the basis of their carbon content (Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2011).
In China, the central government introduced the "Implementing Regulations for Enterprise Income Tax Law" in January of 2008. The law provides a 3-year tax exemption for enterprises developing projects focused on renewable energies and energy conservation technologies. Following the exemption period, these companies are also eligible for a subsequent 3-year period in which their income taxes are set at only 50% of the regular level (Ma, 2011) .
Tax credits are a popular form of support in countries such as the United States (Schmalensee, 2009 ) and Brazil (Batlle & Barroso, 2011 Aside from PTC, ARRA offered an additional support: Investment Tax Credits (ITC) that alleviate some of the development costs associated with new RES-E generation by reducing the regulatory risk linked to PTC. Since the tax credits apply to profits, they can be significantly less valuable for those developers who are not especially profitable, since, for these developers, taxes on income are comparatively low. For this reason, the U.S. Department of the Treasury offers cash grants to new RES-E developers. Both ITCs and cash grants apply to up to 30% of total costs.
Investment Incentives
There are other types of cash supports for RES-E developers. For example, investment subsidies offer upfront payments whose amount depends on the total installed capacity. In the U.S., all states except Arkansas provide some form of investment subsidy for RES-E (Schmalensee, 2009) . Additionally, soft loans are offered across a variety of administrative scales; governments such as Costa Rica have soft loan programs, while, on the other hand, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has committed over US$1 billion in loans for renewable energy development in the Americas, including over US$900 million for hydropower and US$9 million in technical assistance grants (REN21, 2010). These loan programs usually have attractive features such as below-market interest rates and long repayment periods. Finally, some countries enact import duty restrictions in support of local RES-E developers.
Quantity-Based Mechanisms
Renewable Portfolio Standards
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), also referred to as tradable green certificates (TGCs) or renewable obligations (ROs) in the EU, establish quota requirements for consumers, suppliers, and/or generators to ensure that a portion of their electricity comes from RES-E. Tradable certificates are awarded for every unit produced from RES-E; these certificates are then bought by those required to comply with the RES-E quota. 9
Several options exist in the design and implementation of RPS:
• Non-compliance penalties: to enforce observance of RPS, countries such as Sweden have set buy-out penalties equivalent to 150% of the RES-E certificate price, the revenues of which are passed on to RES-E generators. In Chile, a fine of US$28/MWh applies if the requirement is not met; if there is a repeated lack of compliance over a three year period, the fine rises gradually up to US$42/MWh.
• Banding provisions: as implemented in the United Kingdom, RPS requirements are set up differently depending on the source RES-E technology; see Department of Energy and Climate Change (2011). The objective is to ensure an overall push for RES-E by providing higher levels of support for higher cost technologies ("banding up") and to gradually decrease support for lower cost technologies ("banding down"). Support usually comes in the form of tradable certificates. For example, geothermal will receive more certificates per MWh than wind; offshore wind will receive more certificates per MWh than onshore wind.
• Long-term contracting obligations: localities such as California, which has one of the most aggressive RPS schemes in the U.S., have attached long-term contractual obligations to these standards. The state requires stakeholders to source renewable energy from certified units for periods as long as 20 years.
• Minimum prices: RPS regimes can often add an additional support for RES-E through the establishment of minimum prices for renewable certificates, thus guaranteeing revenue safeguards to RES-E producers.
While not as prevalent as price-based mechanisms, RPS are nonetheless currently in place in at least 10 countries and 46 states and provinces. In the U.S., RPS have only been implemented at the state level; 29 have mandatory regimes and an additional 7 have set nonbinding requirements. 10 At the federal level, there have been more than 25 unsuccessful attempts to establish a comprehensive RPS regime over the last decade (Till, 2011) . In early 2011, President Barack Obama's administration announced the goal of doubling the share of clean electricity within the next 25 years. According to the Obama administration, "clean energy" currently accounts for 40% of total electricity. This assertion requires some qualification. According to the 2010 Clean Energy Act, the term "clean energy" refers to a wide variety of options, including solar, wind, geothermal, ocean energy, qualified waste-toenergy, qualified nuclear (if the unit was incorporated on or after the 2010 Act), advanced coal generation, eligible retired fossil fuel generation, as well as any other clean energy 9 In some cases, the tradability of the obligations varies: in the US, for instance, the state of Colorado allows buying certificates all across the United States, while Texas allows in-state trading only.
10 In the U.S., RPS are considered to be a crucial mechanism to more efficiently and quickly deploy RES-E. Yet, it is worth noting that in Texas, often referred to as the paradigmatic example of success in the U.S., RPS appear not to have been the key factor. Overall RPS targets for the year 2025 (10,000MW) were met in 2010 by wind facilities alone-15 years head of schedule. As pointed out by the Texas State Energy Conservation Office (2011), there have been other explaining factors, such as competitive pricing, federal tax incentives, and the state's immense wind resources.
source based on innovative technology "as determined by the Secretary" (U.S. Congress, 2010).
Additionally, there are proposals that seek to implement tradable "clean energy certificates" that could be awarded to generating units according to their efficiency and level of greenhouse gas emissions level. For example, combined cycle gas turbines would be less clean than wind or nuclear generation and receive fewer certificates. If the criteria used to define "clean energy" generation and to allocate the tradable certificates are based on carbon emission rates, then this approach yields similar results to CO2 emissions allowance-trading schemes.
Competitive auctions
Through auctions (tenders), governments and regulators set the amount of renewable capacity to be built during a specific period and carry out a bidding process in order to find the least-costly, most attractive offer from RES-E generators. 11 The winner of the bid is usually offered a long-term contract for the production of renewable electricity, thus reducing the uncertainty for RES-E developers while simultaneously helping regulators meet their own capacity growth objectives.
As it can be read in NYSERDA (2011), 'New York's RPS program uses a central procurement model, with NYSERDA as the central procurement administrator. (...) NYSERDA pays a production incentive to renewable electricity generators selected through competitive solicitations for the electricity they deliver for end use in New York. In exchange for receiving the production incentive, the renewable generator transfers to NYSERDA all rights and/or claims to the RPS attributes associated with each MWh of renewable electricity generated.'
Auctions can be size-or technology-driven, 12 as it is the case of Brazil, 13 and also can be combined with other mechanisms. In Uruguay, winning bidders must incorporate locally manufactured content into the RES-E project. 14
ANALYSIS OF RES-E SUPPORT MECHANISMS: PROS AND CONS
Below we provide an analysis of direct support mechanisms. We keep a special focus on the impacts that each regulatory design has on the overall energy market structure and the potential benefits and barriers that may result in each case.
11 Auctions are always categorized as quantity-based mechanisms, given that bidding processes begin only after regulators have set a specific capacity goal. However, in many cases, energy authorities determine a quantity-price curve that applies to the RES-E technology, keeping the ability to acquire more or less quantity, depending on the bids received. 12 The state of California has set up the Renewable Auction Mechanism (RAM), a mechanism for renewable distributed generation (DG) projects up to 20 MW on the system side of the meter, see California Public Utilities Commission (2010). 13 In the Brazilian case, RES-E technologies are entering the system through competitive long-term auctions, which have taken many different forms (Batlle & Barroso, 2011) . Brazil has implemented auction rules that are meant to favor specific technologies, such as biomass; their bids are multiplied by a factor smaller than 1, thus reducing their costs and making these RES-E more competitive (Batlle & Rodilla, 2010) . Peru has implemented a similar solution. In recent long-term auctions, bids from hydro plants were de-rated to make them more competitive. 14 This is also the case of the FIT implemented in Ontario.
Price-based Mechanisms
FIT.
Pros
Guaranteed remuneration from FIT provides long-term certainty for RES-E developers, who are thus no longer exposed to risks associated with electricity market prices. 15 In addition, unlike price-based mechanisms such as RPS, FIT do not expose RES-E developers to risk in the certificates market, since there is no competition among RES-E providers (see RPS section below for a discussion of this type of risk).
FIT provide the appropriate kind of support for RES-E technologies that have moved beyond the R&D phase but that have not reached market maturity and a strong presence in the system. In other words, FIT can go a long way to foster the commercial viability of RES-E technologies. Conversely, technologies such as solar PV have access to FIT in numerous countries around the world. This has resulted in conditions of over-support and overpayment for PVs, to the extent that the technological improvements can hardly keep up with the regulatory enthusiasm for this RES-E. The designers of a RES-E support mechanism should have clear from the outset whether they want to promote a massive deployment of one or more renewable technologies, to encourage technological innovation or both, as well as the temporal horizon to reach any targets.
FIT place a low administrative burden on regulators and basically have no associated regulatory barriers to RES-E generators who wish to benefit. For instance, FIT reduce barriers to entry since investors do not need to find any electricity buyers (e.g. a retailer or another generator).
Importantly, since RES-E generating units under FIT receive a remuneration that does not depend on wholesale market prices, these plants do not contribute infra-marginal capacity for incumbent generators that operate both traditional generation assets in the energy market as well as RES-E, thus reducing their market power. Consequently, FIT do not create a competitive advantage for incumbent generators and thus level off the playing field across both conventional as well as new RES-E generators.
Cons
The most evident disadvantage of FIT is that is extremely challenging to determine the right remuneration levels for RES-E. Specifically, there is information asymmetry between the regulator in charge of setting the FIT and the producers who will benefit-it is virtually impossible for the former to correctly assess the costs of the latter. There is a distinct risk that FIT will either fall short and fail to produce enough economic incentives for new RES-E developers to enter the electricity market, or that FIT will be too high and result in overinvestment at very high cost, without necessarily resulting in a proportional technological improvement. This is of special concern in RES-E technologies that have relatively similar deployment costs for all developers. 16 A guaranteed revenue stream purely linked to production reduces the incentive for RES-E generators to appropriately react to market price signals by adjusting their production accordingly, as well as reducing any system imbalances between demand and supply. While the response to imbalances applies to all technologies (as shown in the FIP discussion below), only certain RES-E can be considered truly dispatchable, namely biomass and small hydro with reservoir storage, and thus can somehow manage and operate according to energy price signals. However, FIT can incorporate incentives for all RES-E technologies to contribute in reducing imbalances, at least by improving the forecast of their outputs.
Finally, contrary to what it is often assumed, one must not ignore the fact that FIT are subject to the customary regulatory risks, since they are just a regulatory instrument that is backed-up by a regulatory commitment. FIT are embodied in special decrees or in electricity acts and require the government to allocate the incurred additional costs to electricity consumers or to taxpayers. Yet, as governments and political preferences change, so the regulations that govern FIT might also change (although they should not do so retroactively). In the Czech Republic, FIT were recently reduced retroactively after the government determined that RES-E were enjoying unusually high benefits, and (sadly) a similar situation has taken place in the Spanish case for the case of solar PV installations, where recently retroactive measures have been implemented reducing the remuneration that was committed in previous regulations. Moreover, there may be a number of financial reasons why a government or a system operator decides to stop paying for RES-E, as has been the case in some Latin American countries during times of fiscal difficulty. In contrast, a power contract offers more protection since it affords legal recourse to an aggrieved party.
FIP
Pros
Unlike FIT, premiums do not suppress incentives for RES-E generators to adjust their production according to price signals. It is worth noting that this is true for RES-E technologies that are 'dispatchable,' i.e. sources that can increase production in response to high prices: biomass plants can burn more feedstock according to price signals, while windmills are not able to do this. However, wind producers as well as other less dispatchable RES-E generators can still find incentives to more properly manage operations and maintenance as well as forecasting, e.g. wind generators will find it wise to ensure they can produce during the most profitable hours. 17
Cons
Premiums are granted on top of the market prices and thus experience higher risks. As mentioned, at worst, FIP can create an incentive for generators not just to avoid predicting generation but even to engage in gaming via the prediction, which could lead to inefficient electricity dispatch and therefore to potentially higher prices and higher premiums.
The market risks associated with FIP result in more barriers to entry for new RES-E developers and give a competitive advantage to vertically integrated companies (e.g. generation and retail). Therefore, FIP create an incentive for integration of different technologies, which is not necessarily a negative outcome but can nonetheless create market power problems. Conventional generators may expand their portfolio by investing in RES-E technologies and thus gain market power by maintaining infra-marginal capacity, as mentioned in the discussion of FIT. While this may not be of concern in systems where RES-E do not yet occupy a prominent role, it does have an impact in countries such as Spain, where, as mentioned above, wind already provides 15% of total electricity. Indeed, in the Spanish case FIP replaced FIT in 2004. Before this year, many new small independent investors were responsible for a very significant amount of wind installations. Notably, after the change, it is the incumbent generators who own most new installations.
Fiscal and Other Incentives
Pros
Fiscal options have the clear advantage of reducing the cost of financing for the RES-E developers, mainly through flexible or accelerated depreciation over a specific time period. Moreover, mechanisms such as tax credits do not place a direct burden on electricity consumers through increased tariffs. Instead, fiscal incentives become part of the government's or the relevant governmental agency's budget. Needless to say, this characteristic raises other political questions, which will be discussed in the conclusion.
Cons
The most salient problem with fiscal incentives is that they are beneficial only from an equity perspective. In other words, tax credits and other incentives are most useful to RES-E developers who have a large revenue stream and can turn these mechanisms into cash for their own operations. Some RES-E generators may choose to enter into ad-hoc, tax-oriented partnerships and joint ventures with companies with higher profits who would find the fiscal incentives more beneficial.
Also, if the ultimate goal is to encourage the production of renewable electricity, regulators should keep in mind that investment incentives facilitate investment but may no necessarily yield higher levels of production.
Finally, as is the case with FIT, which can change according to government priorities, fiscal incentives that are part of the state's budget items are especially vulnerable to regulatory risks and adjustments.
Quantity-based Mechanisms
Renewable Portfolio Standards
Pros
Ideally, if properly deployed, RPS and similar quota-based mechanisms are the most economically efficient support for RES-E. Determining the target percentage for renewable sources allows for market competition between RES-E developers and for a better determination of energy prices. Moreover, certificate trading encourages overall efficiency and gives generators some flexibility in other to meet government targets. Trading can take place across different geographies and systems, thus increasing the trans-national and transstate efficiencies.
Also, as MIT Professor Richard Schmalensee suggested in one of his lectures, one practical advantage of RPS mechanisms (this is true of fiscal incentives as well) is that the cost of supports are "less visible", since they are embedded in final energy prices, unlike FIT, which have more explicitly defined support levels.
Cons
As inferred in the FIT section above, RES-E providers are subject to two different types of market risk. The first is associated with fluctuations in electricity prices in the wholesale market; RES-E and other generators are all vulnerable to this risk. The second risk comes from trading; for example, with tradable RPS certificates, it is possible that overinvestment in RES-E would lead to low prices for certificates, thus further exposing participants in the market. FIT avoid this altogether.
This second risk, which is linked to the price volatility of RECs, can be significantly reduced if stakeholders are not just subject to a quota requirement, but also compelled to fulfill their commitment by entering into long-term contracts with renewable developers, as it is the case of California, as previously mentioned, and also other US states with RPS regulations.
In those systems in which the retail market has not been fully deregulated or the unbundling levels are weak, a crucial factor for the success of this approach is the mechanism to provide the regulator with sufficient warranties that these purchases are made in a transparent and competitive way, so load serving entities are allowed to pass-through the cost of the contract to consumers. In this context, as it is the case of New York State, centralized auctions appear as the natural solution to avoid complicated monitoring processes on a case by case basis.
In contrast to mechanisms like stepped tariffs, RPS usually do not differentiate across technologies. As a result, generators and other stakeholders will likely prefer the most costefficient technologies in a specific market to meet RPS targets. To fix this shortcoming, as already outlined, the UK and other countries have implemented banding provisions, which provide differentiated levels of trading certificates in support of each one of the technologies (for example awarding solar developers with double amount of certificates than wind ones).
Another alternative is to explicitly define different quotas for different RES-E technologies, forcing for instance a minimum quota of wind and another of solar. The risk with this approach is that it reduces competition within each band and reduces the liquidity of RES-E markets.
Similar to FIP, RPS create incentives for conventional generators to integrate RES-E into their overall portfolios and achieve vertical integration. Again, this tendency can create barriers to entry for new RES-E participants and may result in increased market power for large players; for example, retailers required to abide by RPS will prefer to source renewable electricity from their own affiliates than to purchase power from new RES-E generators.
For example, in Chile, where the market for RES-E is still very recent, conventional generators are required to purchase renewable electricity to meet RPS. The Chilean regulation imposes penalties to enforce compliance when generators fail to meet RES-E targets, the revenue from which is passed on to installed RES-E generating units. Recent experiences in Chile suggest that generators are far from meeting RPS targets. Conventional generators themselves own the few installations already in place (they are not buying renewable power from generating units not affiliated to them). These conventional generators have no problem paying penalties for non-compliance, since the associated costs are unavoidably passed on to consumers and their own RES-E stand to benefit since they are the ultimate recipients of these penalties. Thus, RPS penalties can become de facto feed-intariffs.
Auctions
Pros
Auctions share many of the advantages from FIT mechanisms: reduced risk for RES-E generators as a result of guaranteed remuneration, comparatively low administrative and transaction costs (although larger than FIT's) and a reduction of barriers to entry. However, auctions have a distinct advantage over FIT: they relieve the regulator from the task of having to identify the costs associated with RES-E and instead it is the market participants who have to 'reveal' the appropriate support levels through bidding. In addition, the contracts that usually come with a winning bid reduce long-term risk for RES-E generators.
Auctions effectively centralize the process for RES-E development in the overall system and can thus facilitate economics of scale. In contrast to RPS, where participants such as small retailers must observe and meet specific targets on an individual basis, auctions offer an opportunity for market players to create partnerships and succeed in building more costeffective and efficient RES-E projects.
Cons
Auctions are most effective if the RES-E industry is mature enough to profit from the bidding process and the benefits given to the winning bidder. As the experience in the United Kingdom (UK) has shown, auctions offered at an immature stage can yield no results. In the nineties, as part of the country's overall move toward deregulation, the UK drafted a number of orders, known collectively as the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), to support the delivery of renewable electricity in the system. Consequently, the country carried out a series of auctions for RES-E which were met with great enthusiasm. However, winning bidders underestimated the development costs for what were then still-immature technologies and failed to deliver on their projects. A similar situation took place in China.
In 2003 the government organized the first call for national wind farm concession tenders. As described in Ma (2011) , some developers, especially state-owned enterprises, committed to unreasonably low prices. Since these bids were used to form the benchmark price for ongrid wind tariffs, many companies could not recover their costs. In successive rounds of tenders, bids incorporated the true costs, thus allowing companies to recover their actual investment 18 .
Failure to finish RES-E projects is a critical issue in energy systems that have binding RES targets. In Brazil, for instance, there has been an intense competition in recent rounds of auctions, some of which have ended with winning bids of US$67/MWh, which is a significantly lower figure than others seen in comparatively more mature markets, such as the U.S. There is a legitimate fear that winning bidders will not be able to deliver at these levels. Only time will tell whether these windmills will get installed, but, in any case, the harm from potential delays or lack of development is significantly lower, since Brazil (or Peru, where also auctions were implemented) must not meet any targets by a given date, contrary to the case of EU member states, which have 2020 targets. To counter this risk, auction winners are required to produce financial warranties, which offer an additional mechanism for enforcement. Overall, auctions can be extremely advantageous but require careful and flexible regulatory and rule design in each power system.
Currently, auctions appear to be the unavoidable heirs to successful FIT programs. That is, if too many parties are interested in participating in the RES-E market and benefitting from FIT, governments and regulators soon find themselves with the difficult task of having to allocate limited supports to a large pool of interested parties; there is thus no other option but to switch to auctions. For example, in Spain, current FIT for wind have resulted in more than 40,000 MW applications to the System Operator of interested capacity when the government target is only 2,000 MW per year.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a comprehensive review of direct RES-E support mechanisms, ranging from price-based (FIT, FIP, and tax incentives) to quantity-based schemes (RPS and tenders). We discuss the different components that these designs may include, highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of each one. While most studies of the regulatory design of RES-E support mechanism focus on assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the different alternatives, our discussion pays special attention to a research area that has not received enough attention in the literature: how the different RES-E support schemes impact the performance of the energy market, how they define the interaction between this market and the RES-E sector, and the overall effects on the ownership structure of the RES-E sector.
RES-E, and particularly wind and solar power, have only recently reached significant levels of penetration in some countries, but they are expected to grow considerably in the next few decades. In some electric power systems (e.g. Denmark, Germany, Spain, and Texas), RES-E technologies currently have an important influence on the performance of the energy market by significantly affecting price dynamics, regulatory requirements, the need to balance reserves and manage network congestions, etc. Moreover, RES-E in these systems have a strong impact on electricity tariffs. Therefore, regulatory analyses need to widen their scope to carefully assess how the different support mechanisms affect the energy market performance in the short-(i.e. operations) and in the long-run (expansion), as well as on how mitigate the potential regulatory risks, RES-E installations should make use of long-term contracts that could include the System Operator as counter-party.
Finally, we close with an important remark: regardless of the preferred regulatory design, RES supports have broad and multiple effects in the complete energy model and thus require an equally comprehensive and efficient approach to cost-sharing. Currently, countries and regions around the world are experiencing a growing need for renewables, not only for the power and transport industries but also for the entire economy, mostly due to climate change commitments. This need, coupled with governments' perennial concerns about political sensitivity to increasing energy and fuel rates, especially for electric power, has highlighted the importance of energy tariff design as a critical component of RES and energy system regulation. In Denmark, in 2010, the taxes imposed on the electricity price in order to finance subsidies to renewables and energy research represented 9% of the total price of electricity (DERA, 2011). As of January 2011, electricity consumers will have to pay a EEG reallocation charge (EEG Umlage) of 3.53 Cent/kWh (Lang & Mutschler, 2010) . In 2010, Spain's support expenditures for RES technologies reached €5300 million, 21% of the total electricity bill (Samaniego, 2011) . The Finish government has announced the new FIT will be funded directly from the national budget.
The better the methodology for allocating these costs, the smaller is the risk of public dissatisfaction and hence the larger the amount of total RES that can be deployed. As it is proposed and justified in Batlle (2011) , given that RES targets affect all types of energy supplies, RES-E subsidy costs should not be allocated just among electricity consumers, but across final energy consumers in direct proportion to their energy consumption and regardless of the type of final energy consumed (liquid fuels, gas, electricity, coal, etc.).
